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Abstract 
By means of a re-analysis of the most relevant data source - the international social 
mobility and politics file - this paper criticizes the newly grown consensus in political 
sociology that class voting has declined since World War II. An increase of crosscutting 
cultural voting, rooted in educational differences, rather than a decline of class voting 
proves responsible for the decline of the traditional class-party alignments. Moreover, 
income differences have not become less, but more consequential for voting behavior 
during this period. It is concluded that the new consensus has been built on quicksand. 
Class is not dead – it has been buried alive under the increasing weight of cultural voting, 
systematically misinterpreted as a decline of class voting, due to the widespread 
application of the Alford index.
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Resurrecting Class  
Class Voting and Cultural Voting in Postwar Western Societies (1956-
1990)
 
No one suspected (…) or had reason to suspect, that she was not 
actually dead. She presented all the ordinary appearances of death. 
The funeral (…) was hastened, on account of the rapid advance of 
what was supposed to be decomposition (Edgar Allan Poe, The 
Premature Burial, 1844). 
 
1. Introduction 
 
With their polemically titled article ‘Are Social Classes Dying?’ Clark and Lipset (1991) put the 
cat among the pigeons of class analysis by defending the thesis that the political relevance of 
class had declined substantially since World War II. Their article sparked a lively debate, yielding 
publications with titles such as The Death of Class (Pakulski & Waters 1996), The Promising 
Future of Class Analysis (Goldthorpe & Marshall 1992), and The Breakdown of Class Politics 
(Clark & Lipset 2001, see Clark 2001 for a review). Although some initially rejected Clark and 
Lipset’s claim (e.g. Evans 2000, Goldthorpe 2001, Hout et al. 1993, Manza et al. 1995), it has in 
the meantime become generally accepted that they were basically correct. “With respect to 
politics, social classes are certainly not dead, but the rumours of their imminent death are not all 
that exaggerated”, as Nieuwbeerta (2001: 132) summarizes this new consensus (see also Brooks 
et al. 2004, Evans et al. 1996, Heath et al. 1999, Weakliem & Heath 1999). 
And yet, a remarkable set of research findings suggests that this consensus may be built on 
quicksand. Whereas Nieuwbeerta (1995, 1996, 2001, Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf 1999) has 
demonstrated that in the United States the relationship between class and voting has declined in 
the postwar era, political scientist Stonecash (2000), relying on a different class measure, has 
demonstrated that class voting has in fact become stronger during this period. Consistent with the 
latter’s findings, the salience of class issues has not at all declined since World War II and the 
strength of the relationship between class and voting does not depend on the salience of class 
issues (Achterberg, 2006). Perhaps most surprising, and again suggesting that something is 
seriously wrong, contextual hypotheses derived from the class approach to politics prove 
strikingly impotent in explaining the strength of the relationship between class and politics 
(Nieuwbeerta 1995, Nieuwbeerta & Ultee 1999).  
Taken together, those findings raise the question whether the erosion of the traditional 
alignment of the working class with the left and the middle class with the right since World War 
II has really been caused by a decline of class voting. In what follows, we therefore develop and 
test an alternative explanation. 
 
 
2. Class Voting and Cultural Voting: A Reconceptualization 
 
2.1. Income and Education: Two of a Kind? 
The insight that the working class is liberal or progressive when it comes to issues of economic 
redistribution, but conservative or authoritarian when cultural issues of individual liberty and 
maintenance of social order are at stake, is one of the staples of political sociology (e.g. Lipset 
1981, Middendorp 1991, Houtman, 2001, Houtman, 2003). In Lipset’s classical formulation: 
“Economic liberalism refers to the conventional issues concerning redistribution of income, 
status, and power among the classes. The poorer everywhere are more liberal or leftist on such 
issues (...) On the other hand, when liberalism is defined in non-economic terms – so as to 
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support, for example, civil rights for political dissidents, civil rights for ethnic and racial 
minorities, internationalist foreign policies, and liberal immigration legislation – the correlation is 
reversed” (Lipset 1959: 485). Since Lipset’s pioneering work in this area it has become 
uncontested that economic and cultural liberalism are almost unrelated among the public at large 
(e.g. Fleishman 1988, Heath et al. 1994, Middendorp 1991). 
When it comes to the explanation of economic liberalism, education and income can be 
considered aspects of the same class phenomenon, because a low level of education and a low 
income both lead to a preference of economic redistribution, thus confirming the logic of class 
analysis (De Witte & Billiet 1999, Scheepers et al. 1999, Wright 1985, Achterberg & Houtman, 
2006, Houtman, 2001, Houtman, 2003). When it comes to explaining non-economic types of 
political values, relating to the degree to which one emphasizes individual liberty – e.g., 
postmaterialism in the sense of Inglehart (1977) – or maintenance of social order – e.g., 
authoritarianism in the sense of Adorno et al. (1950) –, however, the picture is radically different. 
In this case, income does not have any explanatory power, whereas education strongly affects 
authoritarianism and postmaterialism (negatively and positively, respectively) (Houtman, 2003). 
Inglehart (1977: 72-89) rightly concludes from this that education does not simply indicate class 
or occupational status (see also Houtman, 2001, Houtman, 2003). And indeed, it is by and large 
agreed today that working-class authoritarianism, unlike working-class economic 
progressiveness, has nothing to do with its weak economic position and everything with its 
limited level of education (e.g. Dekker & Ester 1987, Grabb 1979, 1980, Van de Werfhorst & De 
Graaf 2004). 
 Although sociologists have always underscored that social class (like socio-economic 
status, for that matter) is closely related to both education and income (e.g. Duncan 1961, Hout et 
al. 1993, Ishida & Muller 1995, Kohn 1977, Lipset 1981, Marshall et al. 1988, Van de Werfhorst 
& De Graaf 2004), in short, those research findings point out that education cannot be taken to 
indicate class just like that. It can when the explanation of economic liberalism is at stake, but it 
cannot when we are dealing with the explanation of cultural liberalism (“postmaterialism”) or 
cultural conservatism (“authoritarianism”) (Houtman, 2001, Houtman, 2003). 
 
2.2. Distinguishing Cultural Voting from Class Voting  
Notwithstanding their lack of explanatory power for authoritarianism, postmaterialism and the 
like, class and income are of course strongly and positively related to education. This 
circumstance makes it quite problematic that studies on class voting typically rely on an index 
introduced by Alford (1967) in the 1960s. This so-called “Alford index” measures the strength of 
the bivariate relationship between class and voting. The almost universal acceptance of this 
practice is underscored by the circumstance that it is not only used by Clark and Lipset in their 
influential article (1991), but also accepted by their critics, although the latter suggest some 
methodological refinements (Hout et al. 1993). Nieuwbeerta (1995, 1996, 2001, Nieuwbeerta and 
De Graaf 1999) also uses the Alford index in his large-scale study, which has been vital in 
establishing the contemporary consensus, just like a variety of researchers who have contributed 
chapters to the two key volumes about the Death of Class Debate (Clark & Lipset 2001, Evans 
1999).[1] 
  Under the heading Why Expect Class Voting?, Alford (1967) has argued that his 
approach is based on the assumption that class-related economic interests underlie the familiar 
relationship between class and voting: “A relation between class position and voting behavior is a 
natural and expected association in the Western democracies for a number of reasons: the 
existence of class interests, the representation of these interests by political parties, and the 
regular association of certain parties with certain interests. Given the character of the stratification 
order and the way political parties act as representatives of different class interests, it would be 
remarkable if such a relation were not found” (1967: 68-69). Although Alford thus correctly 
underscores that the familiar alignments emerge from working-class economic liberalism and 
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middle-class economic conservatism, his index nevertheless neglects this voting motivation and 
merely relies on the strength of the bivariate relationship between class position and voting 
behavior. 
This omission is quite problematical, because Alford’s index thus effectively mixes up 
class voting, i.e., voting for a leftist (rightist) party on the basis of economic liberalism 
(conservatism) that is rooted in a weak (strong) class position, with what we shall henceforth call 
cultural voting, i.e., voting for a rightist (leftist) party on the basis of authoritarianism 
(libertarianism) that is rooted in a low (high) level of education (Achterberg & Houtman, 2006, 
Houtman, 2001, Houtman, 2003). It needs to be underscored that the latter type of voting has 
nothing to do with the former, because it is driven by a cultural rather than an economic voting 
motivation, stems from education rather than class, and cross pressures the electorate to vote 
contradictory to its class-based economic interests. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1: Class Voting Distinguished from Cultural Voting. ABOUT HERE] 
 
Figure 1 disentangles both types of voting: the upper part denotes class voting and the lower part 
crosscutting cultural voting. It points out that the strength of the relationship between class and 
voting, as it is measured by the Alford index, cannot tell us anything about the degree to which 
class affects the vote. This is because both types of voting work in opposite directions and may 
vary independent of one another. A preference for economic redistribution that is rooted in a 
weak class position and that drives leftist voting, perfectly consistent with the logic of class 
voting, can thus be cancelled out by an equally strong tendency among the poorly educated to 
vote for rightist parties, driven by high levels of authoritarianism. Measuring class voting as the 
strength of the bivariate relationship between class and voting then leads to the mistaken 
conclusion that “class does not affect the vote”. It is important to underscore that this is not 
merely a hypothetical construction, but rather a realistic image of what occurs in the real world 
(Achterberg & Houtman, 2006, Houtman, 2001, Houtman, 2003). Reliance on the bivariate 
relationship between class and voting can even produce the conclusion that “class voting has 
declined” if it has in fact increased. This happens if class voting and cultural voting have both 
increased, but the latter more so than the former. 
 
2.3. Hypotheses 
It is not clear at all, to sum up the foregoing, whether the decline of the familiar alignment of the 
working class with the left and the middle class with the right since World War II, convincingly 
documented by Nieuwbeerta (1995, 1996, 2001, Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf 1999), has really 
been caused by a decline of class voting. It is certainly possible that it has, but it may also have 
been caused by an increase of cultural voting. And indeed, as already briefly indicated above, 
three sets of research findings point in the direction of the latter possibility. 
Firstly, Stonecash (2000: 140), relying on income for the measurement of class, has 
demonstrated that the relationship between class and voting has become stronger rather than 
weaker in the United States since World War II, concluding: “rather than class divisions fading in 
relevance, they are likely to be a staple of American politics for some time”. Telling detail: 
Nieuwbeerta relies on the same data as Stonecash, although he adds data from other countries to 
those. The difference between their findings, then, seems particularly caused by Stonecash’s 
decision to use income categories and Nieuwbeerta’s to instead rely on the (occupation-based) 
EGP class schema (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992, Erikson et al. 1979). Our discussion above 
points out that this is not a trivial difference, because income categories, unlike occupational 
categories, are not susceptible to the problem of mixing up class voting and cultural voting, 
because no relationship exists between income and authoritarianism / libertarianism. With those 
two operationalizations of class producing such radically different findings, the decline of the 
traditional class-party alignments that Nieuwbeerta has demonstrated (1995, 1996, 2001, 
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Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf 1999) therefore more likely denotes an increase of cultural voting than 
a decline of class voting. 
Secondly, if a decline of class voting had taken place since World War II, we would expect 
that class issues would have become less politically salient during this period. This is not the case, 
however (Achterberg, 2006), although it is equally clear that cultural issues of individual liberty 
and social order have become more salient during this period (Hechter 2004, Layman 2001, 
Achterberg, 2006). Moreover, the salience of class issues does not affect the strength of the 
relationship between class and voting at all, whereas this relationship is substantially weaker in 
periods and countries in which cultural issues are more salient (Achterberg, 2006). This suggests, 
again, that we have not been witnessing a decline of class voting, but rather an increase of 
cultural voting since World War II. 
Thirdly, class analysis proves remarkably impotent in predicting the periods and countries 
in which the relationship between class and voting is weakest. Hypotheses derived from the class 
approach to politics, predicting the circumstances under which class distinctions are more or less 
salient, are rejected almost without exception (Nieuwbeerta 1995, Nieuwbeerta & Ultee 1999). If 
differences in the bivariate relationship between class and voting are taken to indicate differences 
in levels of class voting, those findings are obviously very surprising. Although it is of course 
conceivable that the class approach to politics is completely flawed, we consider it at least equally 
likely that differences in the bivariate relationship between class and voting indicate differences 
in levels of cultural voting instead. If this is the case – and this is precisely what the two other 
clusters of findings that we have just discussed suggest –, the failure of hypotheses derived from 
the class approach to politics ceases to be surprising. 
To find out whether the declining alignment of the working class with the left and the 
middle class with the right has been caused by a decline of class voting or by an increase of 
cultural voting, we re-analyze Nieuwbeerta’s data. We test two hypotheses. The first one tests 
whether a decline of class voting has occurred. It predicts that the decline of the relationship 
between EGP class and voting behavior has been caused by a decline of the tendency of those 
with low incomes to vote for parties on the left and those with high incomes to vote for parties on 
the right. The second hypothesis tests whether an increase of cultural voting has taken place. It 
predicts that the decline of the relationship between EGP class and voting behavior has been 
caused by an increase of the tendency of the poorly educated to vote for parties on the right and 
the highly educated to vote for parties on the left. 
 
 
3. Data and Measurement 
 
3.1. Data 
As mentioned above, we re-analyze the data Nieuwbeerta has used to demonstrate the decline of 
the traditional alignment of the working class with the left and the middle class with the right 
(Nieuwbeerta & Ganzeboom 1996). Due to two deviations from Nieuwbeerta’s measurement of 
voting behavior, to be discussed below, we analyze data about 93,567 respondents, who have 
been sampled in 15 different countries between 1956 and 1990, adding up to a total of 80 
combinations of country and year (see Table 1). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1: Number of data files for each of the combinations of country and period 
(1956-1990, N=80). ABOUT HERE] 
 
3.2. Measurement 
Class – Like Nieuwbeerta, we measure class by means of the EGP class schema, which assigns 
seven different class positions on the basis of occupation, self-employed status and number of 
people supervised (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992: 38-39). It is important to emphasize that the seven 
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EGP classes do not constitute a simple hierarchy (Goldthorpe 1980: 42). The three nonmanual 
classes (higher professionals, lower professionals, and non-manual workers) and the three manual 
ones constitute two separate hierarchies, to be sure, but the hierarchical relationship between these 
two is undetermined. The same goes for the relationship between each of those hierarchies and the 
petty bourgeoisie. The higher professionals, the lower professionals, and the petty bourgeoisie can be 
classified unambiguously as middle class, while the classes of skilled manual workers on the one 
hand and semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers on the other together constitute the working 
class. The third and most privileged manual class constitutes “a latter-day aristocracy of labour or a 
‘blue collar’ élite” (Goldthorpe 1980: 41). It consists of lower-grade technicians and supervisors of 
manual workers and can as such be distinguished from the “real” working class. Likewise, the least 
privileged nonmanual class, i.e., that of nonmanual workers, can be distinguished from the “real” 
middle class as consisting of “white collar proletarians” (e.g. Wright 1979). In interpreting the 
statistical results, in short, especially the voting behavior of the higher professionals, lower 
professionals, and petty bourgeoisie on the one hand (“middle class”) and the skilled, semi-skilled 
and unskilled manual workers on the other (“working class’) is important. EGP class is entered into 
the analysis as a series of six dummy variables, using the higher professionals as the reference 
category. 
Income – Following Erikson (1984), net household income is used to determine income 
levels. To allow comparison of the regression coefficients of income with other variables this 
variable has been standardized first for each country and year combination separately. 
Education – To standardize the educational classifications in the 15 countries, education 
has first been recoded into the number of years minimally required to attain the level of education 
at hand and has next been standardized in the same way as income. 
Voting behavior – like Nieuwbeerta (1995: 35), we have used data about the party one 
would vote for if elections were held today (or soon), about the party one has voted for in the 
past, and the party one identifies with. If valid answers to all of these three questions were 
available, we used the first one, i.e., voting intention. If valid answers to only the last two were 
available, we used party identification. We do not use Nieuwbeerta’s crude left versus non-left 
distinction, because it creates more or less arbitrary decisions in coding parties in the political 
center. We instead scale voting behavior according to left-right self-placement, so as to produce a 
continuous variable with high scores indicating rightist voting.[2] It is quite remarkable, for that 
matter, that Nieuwbeerta codes new-leftist parties as non-left parties. Given massive support for 
those parties from the middle class (Hoffman-Martinot 1991, Inglehart 1997: 273-288), it needs 
no further argument that this decision produces a less dramatic decline of the relationship 
between class and voting than has actually occurred. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
Before testing our two hypotheses, we demonstrate that EGP class, education, and income are 
related in ways that make EGP class too ambiguous a variable in the study of class voting. We 
apply multilevel regression analysis, conceiving of country, year, and respondent as three 
different levels of analysis. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2: Income explained from EGP-class and education (multilevel regression 
analysis, entries are regression coefficients and standard Errors, maximum likelihood estimation, 
N = 93,567 respondents and 15 countries, 1956-1990). ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 2 points out that substantial income differences exist between the seven EGP classes 
(Model 1). The class of higher professionals has the highest average income and the classes of 
skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled manual workers the lowest. The classes also differ strongly 
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with respect to education, however, and this accounts for a substantial part of those income 
differences (Model 2). The seven classes differ strongly with respect to both income and 
education, in short, and this makes EGP class too ambiguous a variable for the study of class 
voting. Whereas income and education both drive class voting, as we have argued above, it is 
after all education alone that constitutes the driving force behind crosscutting cultural voting. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3: Rightist voting explained by social class (multilevel regression analysis, 
entries are regression coefficients and standard errors, maximum likelihood estimation, N = 93,567 
respondents and 15 countries, 1956-1990).  ABOUT HERE] 
 
Using rightist voting as the dependent variable and six EGP class dummies as the independent 
ones, we next turn to the relationship between EGP class and voting behavior and the way this 
relationship has changed in the postwar era. It is evident that the skilled, semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers vote for leftist parties more often than the middle class (Table 3, Model 1) and 
it is also clear that those traditional alignments have weakened across time (Model 2). There is 
nothing surprising about this finding, of course, because it has previously been published by 
Nieuwbeerta (1995, 1996, 2001, Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf 1999), based on an analysis of the 
same data. 
This decline of the relationship between EGP class and voting behavior cannot be 
interpreted as indicating a decline of class voting just like that, however, as Table 4 points out. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4: Rightist voting explained by income and education (multilevel regression 
analysis, entries are regression coefficients and standard errors, maximum likelihood estimation, N 
= 93,567 respondents and 15 countries, 1956-1990). ABOUT HERE] 
 
Although both those with high incomes and those with high levels of education are more inclined 
to vote for rightist parties, both of those relationships have changed across time, albeit in radically 
different directions. The significant cross-level interactions of education and income with year 
(Models 2 and 3) point out that those with low levels of education have come to vote more 
rightist, while those with low incomes have come to vote more leftist across the years. This is 
obviously not what one would expect if those two variables were two of a kind. Indeed, the 
former development can be interpreted as an increase of cultural voting and the latter as an 
increase of class voting, as we have explained above. This brings us to our principal question: has 
the decline of the relationship between EGP class and voting behavior indeed been caused by this 
increase of cultural voting? 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5: Rightist voting explained by social class, income and education (multilevel 
regression analysis, entries are regression coefficients and standard errors, maximum likelihood 
estimation, N = 93,567 respondents and 15 countries, 1956-1990). ABOUT HERE] 
 
Obviously, the increasing tendency of the working class to vote for rightist parties cannot be 
explained from the increase of class voting, i.e., the increasing tendency of those with low 
incomes to vote for parties on the left (Table 5, Model 2). As expected, however, the increase of 
cultural voting, i.e., the increased tendency of those with low levels of education to vote for 
rightist parties, accounts for most of the shift of the working class towards rightist parties (Model 
3). Although the traditional class alignments have clearly weakened in the postwar era, in short, 
this has not been caused by a decline of class voting, but by an increase of crosscutting cultural 
voting. 
 
 
5. Conclusion and Debate 
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What Stonecash has demonstrated for the United States applies more generally: class voting has 
not declined during the postwar era, but has even become stronger. The suggestion to the contrary 
has been informed by studies of the development of the bivariate relationship between 
occupation-based class categories (especially the EGP class schema) and voting behavior. As it 
happens, this type of class measure inevitably and wrongly mixes up class voting, driven by 
class-based economic interests, and reverse cultural voting, driven by a cultural dynamics that is 
instead rooted in educational differences. It as such precludes valid conclusions as to whether or 
not the decline of the familiar alignments denotes a decline of class voting or an increase of 
cultural voting. 
 Our findings, relying on income to indicate class more validly, and acknowledging the 
double role of education in driving class voting as well as reverse cultural voting, leave little to 
the imagination. The gradual erosion of the pattern of a leftist-voting working class and a rightist-
voting middle class has been caused by an increase of crosscutting cultural voting, driven by a 
cultural dynamics that is rooted in educational differences. Class voting, measured more validly 
by using income categories, has not declined, but has in fact become even stronger in the postwar 
era.  
The intellectual consensus that has emerged since Clark and Lipset sparked the ‘Death of 
Class Debate’ in the beginning of the 1990s does not hold that class is actually dead, to be sure, 
but rather that it is dying a slow – and perhaps painful – death. Our findings necessitate a critical 
reassessment of this consensus. Like those of Stonecash (2000) for the United States, they point 
out that there is nothing “dead” or “dying” about class, after all. We feel it is more apt to say that 
class has been buried alive under the increasing weight of cultural voting, systematically 
misinterpreted as a decline of class voting due to an invalid measurement practice that has 
become an intellectual routine since Alford’s pioneering work in the 1960s. As a lamentable 
consequence, poor old class now suffers its undeserved and horrid fate, “with thoughts of the air 
and grass above, with memory of dear friends who would fly to save us if but informed of our 
fate, and with consciousness that of this fate they can never be informed” (Poe 1844). 
Disentangling class voting and cultural voting more carefully in future empirical research is 
necessary to save class from this “most terrific of the ghastly extremes of agony” (Ibid.). 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. Following Hout et al.’s (1993) critique of the analysis by Clark and Lipset (1991), Nieuwbeerta uses 
more fine-grained class distinctions than the conventional manual-nonmanual dichotomy and relies on log-
odds-ratios, so as to arrive at a measure of relative rather than absolute class voting. This methodological 
revision of the Alford index leaves it theoretically intact, however, because the resulting “kappa index” still 
boils down to the idea that the degree to which class drives the vote can be measured as the strength of the 
relationship between class and voting. It is quite telling, indeed, that Nieuwbeerta’s own research points out 
that his methodological revision of Alford’s index produces basically similar findings as the original 
version: “The main finding is that the various measures of class voting (yield) the same conclusions with 
respect to the ranking of the countries according to their levels of class voting and according to the speed of 
declines in class voting” (Nieuwbeerta 1996: 370). 
2. Our departure from Nieuwbeerta’s operationalization, and especially our decision to code the political 
parties according to their constituencies’ left-right self-placement, causes a substantial increase of the 
number of missing values: 33 of the 113 original datasets are excluded, causing Sweden (with three 
datasets) to disappear from our analysis altogether. 
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Table 1: Number of data files for each of the combinations of country and period (1956-1990, 
N=80). 
Country 1956-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 Total Period 
Australia 1 - 3 4 1985-1987 
Austria - 1 3 4 1974-1989 
Belgium - 1 - 1 1975 
Canada - - 1 1 1984 
Denmark - 1 - 1 1972 
Finland - 2 - 2 1972-1975 
France - 1 - 1 1978 
Germany 1 2 6 9 1969-1990 
Great Britain - 2 6 8 1974-1990 
Ireland - - 1 1 1990 
Italy 1 1 - 2 1968-1975 
The Netherlands 1 6 7 14 1970-1990 
Norway  1 2 4 7 1965-1990 
Switzerland - 1 - 1 1976 
United States 7 8 9 24 1956-1990 
Total 12 28 40 80 1956-1990 
Table 2: Income explained from EGP-class and education (multilevel regression analysis, entries are regression coefficients and standard 
Errors, maximum likelihood estimation, N = 93,567 respondents and 15 countries, 1956-1990). 
Independents Null model Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 3.146*** (.297) 3.146*** (.297) 3.146*** (.297) 
 
Higher professionals (=ref.)   0  0  
Lower professionals   -.222*** (.011) -.206*** (.011) 
Non-manual workers   -.568*** (.012) -.380*** (.012) 
Petty bourgeoisie   -.427*** (.009) -.242*** (.010) 
Higher working class   -.179*** (.008) -.089*** (.008) 
Skilled workers   -.612*** (.011) -.368*** (.011) 
Semi and unskilled workers   -.867*** (.011) -.545*** (.012) 
Education     .587*** (.008) 
Variance country level .772 (.457) .771 (.456) .771 (.456) 
Variance year level 1.429*** (.248) 1.430*** (.248) 1.430*** (.248) 
Variance individual level 5.405*** (.025) 4.948*** (.023) 4.695*** (.022) 
Deviance 423871.7  415616.9  410698.2  
* p< .05; ** p< .01; *** p< .001 
Table 3: Rightist voting explained by social class (multilevel regression analysis, entries are 
regression coefficients and standard errors, maximum likelihood estimation, N = 93,567 
respondents and 15 countries, 1956-1990). 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Constant 4.796*** (.191) 4.796*** (.191) 
 
Fixed effects 
    
Higher professionals (ref.) 0  0  
Lower professionals -.086*** (.018) -.090*** (.018) 
Non-manual workers -.139*** (.022) -.141*** (.022) 
Petty bourgeoisie .058 (.029) .055 (.029) 
Higher working class -.083*** (.023) -.084*** (.023) 
Skilled workers -.313*** (.052) -.313*** (.052) 
Semi and unskilled workers -.307*** (.057) -.308*** (.057) 
Year .020 (.024) .020 (.024) 
 
Interactions 
    
Year x Higher professionals (ref.)   0  
Year x Lower professionals   -.011 (.008) 
Year x Non-manual workers   .019* (.009) 
Year x Petty bourgeoisie   .013 (.008) 
Year x Higher working class   .011 (.008) 
Year x Skilled workers   .037** (.009) 
Year x Semi and unskilled workers   .033** (.010) 
 
Variance random slopes country level 
    
Higher professionals (ref.)     
Lower professionals .003 (.002) .003 (.002) 
Non-manual workers .005* (.002) .005* (.002) 
Petty bourgeoisie .009* (.004) .009* (.004) 
Higher working class .005 (.003) .005 (.003) 
Skilled workers .038* (.015) .037* (.015) 
Semi and unskilled workers .045* (.018) .044* (.017) 
 
Variance random slopes year level 
    
Higher professionals (ref.)     
Lower professionals .001 (.001) .000 (.000) 
Non-manual workers .001* (.000) .001* (.000) 
Petty bourgeoisie .001 (.001) .001 (.001) 
Higher working class .002* (.001) .002* (.001) 
Skilled workers .002* (.001) .001 (.001) 
Semi and unskilled workers .002* (.001) .001 (.001) 
Variance country level  .523** (.191) .523** (.191) 
Variance year level .040*** (.007) .040*** (.007) 
Variance individual level 2.036*** (.009) 2.036*** (.009) 
Deviance 332794.4  332746.8  
* p< .05; ** p< .01; *** p< .001 
Table 4: Rightist voting explained by income and education (multilevel regression analysis, entries are regression coefficients and standard 
errors, maximum likelihood estimation, N = 93,567 respondents and 15 countries, 1956-1990). 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Constant 4.796*** (.191) 4.796*** (.191) 4.796*** (.191) 
 
Fixed effects 
      
Income  .099** (.027) .098** (.027) .101** (.028) 
Education .104* (.048) .100* (.048) .099* (.046) 
Year .020 (.024) .020 (.024) .020 (.024) 
 
Interactions 
  
    
Education x year   -.037** (.009) -.040** (.009) 
Income x year     .024* (.010) 
 
Variance random slopes country level 
      
Income .007 (.004) .007 (.004) .007 (.004) 
Education .031* (.013) .028* (.011) .028* (.011) 
 
Variance random slopes year level 
      
Income .006*** (.001) .006*** (.001) .005*** (.001) 
Education .004** (.001) .003** (.001) .003** (.001) 
Variance country level  .523** (.191) .523** (.191) .523** (.191) 
Variance year level .040*** (.007) .040*** (.007) .040*** (.007) 
Variance individual level 2.114*** (.009) 2.114*** (.009) 2.114*** (.009) 
Deviance 336131.1  336114.1  336108.5  
* p< .05; ** p< .01; *** p< .001 
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Table 5: Rightist voting explained by social class, income and education (multilevel regression analysis, entries are regression coefficients and 
standard errors, maximum likelihood estimation, N = 93,567 respondents and 15 countries, 1956-1990). 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Constant 4.796*** (.191) 4.796*** (.191) 4.796*** (.191) 
 
Fixed effects 
      
Higher professionals (ref.) 0  0  0  
Lower professionals -.077*** (.018) -.072*** (.018) -.072*** (.018) 
Non-manual workers -.118*** (.024) -.101*** (.022) -.101*** (.022) 
Petty bourgeoisie .079** (.030) .108** (.029) .108** (.029) 
Higher working class -.076** (.023) -.071** (.023) -.071** (.023) 
Skilled workers -.284*** (.053) -.256*** (.052) -.256*** (.052) 
Semi and unskilled workers -.272*** (.058) -.244*** (.057) -.244*** (.057) 
Income  .097** (.005) .086** (.019) .086** (.019) 
Education -.005 (.006) .020 (.038) .020 (.038) 
Year .020 (.024) .020 (.024) .020 (.024) 
 
Interactions 
      
Year x Higher professionals (ref.) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Year x Lower professionals -.010 (.008) -.011 (.008) -.012 (.008) 
Year x Non-manual workers .019* (.008) .016 (.009) .012 (.009) 
Year x Petty bourgeoisie .007 (.008) .003 (.009) -.002 (.009) 
Year x Higher working class .011 (.008) .008 (.007) .006 (.007) 
Year x Skilled workers .034** (.009) .030** (.009) .024** (.009) 
Year x Semi and unskilled workers .019** (.010) .025** (.010) .017 (.010) 
Year x Income   .025** (.009) .029** (.009) 
Year x Education     -.038** (.009) 
 
Variance random slopes country level 
      
Higher professionals (ref.)       
Lower professionals .003 (.002) .002* (.001) .002* (.001) 
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Non-manual workers .005 (.003) .001 (.001) .001 (.001) 
Petty bourgeoisie .010* (.005) .014* (.006) .014* (.006) 
Higher working class .005 (.003) .004* (.002) .004* (.002) 
Skilled workers .038** (.015) .019* (.008) .019* (.008) 
Semi and unskilled workers .046* (.018) .023* (.009) .023* (.009) 
Income .003 (.002) .003 (.002) .003 (.002) 
Education .021* (.009) .018* (.008) .018* (.008) 
 
Variance random slopes year level 
      
Higher professionals (ref.)       
Lower professionals .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Non-manual workers .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Petty bourgeoisie .001 (.001) .001 (.001) .001 (.001) 
Higher working class .002 (.001) .001 (.001) .001 (.001) 
Skilled workers .001* (.000) .001* (.000) .001* (.000) 
Semi and unskilled workers .001 (.001) .001* (.000) .001 (.001) 
Income  .003** (.001) .003** (.001) .003** (.001) 
Education .004** (.001) .004** (.001) .003** (.001) 
Variance country level  .523** (.191) .523** (.191) .523** (.191) 
Variance year level .040*** (.007) .040*** (.007) .040*** (.007) 
Variance individual level 2.028*** (.009) 2.014*** (.009) 2.014*** (.009) 
Deviance 332375.6  331881.0  331881.0  
* p< .05; ** p< .01; *** p< .001 
 
